Harmony shaftstewards training course by NUM
HARMONY SHAFTSTEWARDS TRAINING COURSE
PROGRAMME
Day 1: Monday 5 December
09.00 - 10.30 Welcome, induction and introducing the 
programme
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 11.30 What happens at Harmony?
- views of the shaftstewards
11.30 - 12.30 Giving the context
- crisis in the mining industry
- introducing the Harmony agreements
12.30 - 13.00 The role of shaftstewards in monitoring 
profit-sharing schemes 
-  what information is needed for monitoring
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch break
14.00 - 15.30 Calculations I 
(Presentation and exercises)
15.30 - 15.40 Tea break
15.40 - 17.00 Calculations II 
(Presentation and exercises)
Day 2: Tuesday 6 December
09.00 - 10.30 Mine economics I
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 13.00 Exercises on mine economics
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.30 Productivity theory
15.30 - 15.40 Tea
15.40 - 17.00 Private study
Day 3: Wednesday 7 December
09.00 - 10.30 Introducing company accounts
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 13.00 Exercises on company accounts
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.00 Private study
15.00 - 17.00 Visit to the Num office
Day 4: Thursday 8 December
09.00 - 10.30 Test: calculations and company accounts
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 13.00 Company accounts II: The Harmony income 
statement
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
15.00 - 15.30 Exercises on the Harmony income statement
15.30 - 15.40 Tea break
15.40 - 17.00 Private study
Day 5: Friday 9 December
09.00 - 10.30 The profit-sharing agreement at Harmony
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 12.00 Exercises on the Harmony profit sharing 
agreement
12.00 - 13.00 Company accounts III - Harmony's balance sheet
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.30 Exercises on the Harmony's balance sheet
15.30 - 15.40 Tea break
Private study15.40 17.00
Day 6: Monday 12 December
09.00 - 10.30 Test: income statement and balance sheet
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 13.00 The productivity agreement at Harmony
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.30 Exercises on the Harmony's productivity 
agreement
15.30 - 15.40 Tea break
15.40 - 17.00 Revision: calculations and company accounts
Day 7: Tuesday 13 December
09.00 - 10.30 Revision: Mine economics
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.40 - 13.00 Revision: Productivity
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.30 Revision: Company accounts
15.30 - 15.40 Tea break
15.40 - 17.00 Revision: Company accounts
Day 8: Wednesday 14 December
09.00 - 10.30 Monitoring the profit-sharing agreement
10.30 - 10.40 Tea break
10.30 - 13.00 Monitoring the profit-sharing agreement
13.00 - 14.00 Lunch
14.00 - 15.30 Calculations: profit-sharing
15.30 - 15.40 Tea break
15.40 - 17.00 Evaluation
The Economics of a Mine
Revenue - Costs = Profit
Revenue
Revenue is the amount of money a mine gets from selling the gold it produces.
Revenue depends on three things: the amount of gold sold
the price of gold in US dollars 
the rand/dollar exchange rate
THE AMOUNT OF:
Revenue
DEPENDS ON which depends on
the gold price received The World Supply of Gold
- central bank sales
- newly mined production
- dis-hoarding / scrap sales
The World Demand for Gold
- Gold jewellery sales
- investment demand
- industrial uses
Hedging (selling some or all 
gold production in advance 
at a fixed price)










- productivity (many factors 
influence this)
- hours worked
- number of blasts/month
2
Costs
THE AMOUNT OF: DEPENDS ON which depends on
Costs Wages -Wage/skill levels
- Amount of overtime
- Number of workers





Interest payments Outstanding loans
Administration fees
Development Costs/Capex





Profit depends on revenue and costs. Profit is a surplus; it is what is left over after the 
mine has paid the suppliers and workers the amounts agreed on or negotiated.
THE AMOUNT PROFIT 
DISTRIBUTED TO:
DEPENDS ON which depends on





Prospects for the future Gold price, government tax 
policy on ring fencing
Government as taxation Mining tax formula Tax policy
Workers as a profit share Profit sharing agreement
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MONITORING PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES
Proposals from the NUM Collective Bargaining Department
on_Quarterlv meetings
1. TIMING: The meetings must be held immediately after the
publication of the results in the press
2. INFORMATION: The company must send full details of the
results and the calculations to the head office of NUM to
allow the union to confirm they are correct, as well as to 
each NUM branch committee.
3. CONTENT: The agenda items for Quarterly Meetings should
include:
* Presentation of quarterly results and performance
details (the form the information is presented in needs 
to be agreed so it is as easy as possible to follow)
* An explanation of the profit share calculations
* An explanation of how the profit share is distributed to 
workers
* Discussion and questions
* Monitoring issues (see below)
* Evaluation of training courses conducted in the last 
quarter to assist NUM members to understand the scheme
* Any other items outstanding from the agenda of the last 
monthly meeting
NOM C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a i n i n g  D e p a r t m e n t
MONITORING PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES
Proposals from the NUM CollectiyeBargaining Department
on Monthly meetings
TIMING: The dates must be set in advance
2 . CONTENT
include
: The agenda items for Monthly Meetings should
Report from the mine on trends in deaths accidents and 
injuries and a discussion of the report
Report from the mine on changes in total employment and 
a justification for these changes and a discussion
Monitoring information requested by the NUM under clause 
2.4 of the Chamber agreement
Report from the mine on changes planned or implemented 
to improve productivity and a discussion of the report
Progress report from the mine on training courses that 
the mine has sent workers on to improve their skills and 
capacity and a review of future plans to train workers. 
Discussion.
Outstanding items from previous meeting.
THESE ARE SIMPLY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AGENDA FROM THE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING DEPARTMENT - THEY DO NOT ALL NEED TO BE HARD AND FAST 
DEMANDS. THE TRAINING COURSE CAN COME UP WITH OTHER PROPOSALS 
THE POINT IS TO START THE PROCESS.
» nN O M  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a i n i n g  D e p a r t n e n t
MONITORING PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES
Issues for review
A. REPRESENTATION FROM THE REGION AND HEAD OFFICE
The mine should make it practically possible for regional and head 
office officials to attend meetings on the profit sharing scheme 
when they are invited to do so by the branch committee. This 
means that dates should be set well in advance.
B. TRAINING COMMITMENT
What steps has the mine taken, since October 1992, when the 
agreement was signed, to promote skills training for NUM members?
C. HEALTH AND SAFETY
How has the health and safety of workers fared since the scheme 
came into operation? If the trends are worse, why is this? The 
agreements say that increased profits must not be at the expense 
of safety.
E. DISCRIMINATION IN THE SCHEME
Why does the mine give the shareholders information on profits and 
results before the workers? This is unfair discrimination against 
our members because they are black and the shareholders are all 
white (or companies controlled by whites)
F. WORKER PAYMENT
What arrangements has the mine made to inform members of the 
arrangements under clause 2.5 of the new Anglo agreement for those J\[> 
who leave the mine to get their profit shares in a bank or savings ^  
account?
Check that the management team have the documents they need, and 
that they have read the agreements!
1.
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PROFIT SHARING ON THE GOLD MINES
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The first session of the NUM training course on profit sharing 
poses and tries to answer these questions:
Why does the NUM get involved in profit sharing?
What is profit sharing?
What agreements are there on profit sharing?
What do the agreements say?
But many other questions are asked at all stages! The questions 
listed below come up often at the profit sharing courses. When 
they come up, we write them on the board to make sure they get 
dealt with during the session.
Please feel free to send in any additional questions to the 
Collective Bargaining Department (preferably with suggested 
answers! )
How can we trust that the information the management gives us on 
profit sharing is correct?
We can never be absolutely certain. All we can do is make sure^ 
the information we are given, tallies with the information the 
mine gives to its owners.
We compare the information that management gives to us with the 
information management gives to the shareholders, the government 
and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. We aim to check that the 
information given to the union is the same as that given to the 
owners of the mine and the people they deal with in business, the 
press and in the government. So, if the information is 
incorrect, the mining company is telling the same lies to its 
shareholders, the government and the stock exchange. This is the 
most we can say about the correctness of the information we get.
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If, when we monitor the results, we think that something is 
wrong, we can ask the mine's external auditors to check the 
mine's results. These auditors are appointed by the shareholders 
to look after their interests. The auditors report to the 
shareholders every year on whether the management and the 
directors have produced an accurate report of the state of the 
company. The shareholders do not all control the company and, 
just like the workers, they are concerned that the results are 
correct and truthful.
All we can say is that, because we get the same information as 
the shareholders (and a bit more in most cases), the information 
is the best we can get, short of sending our own investigators in 
to look at the company's results.
Can the management cheat us by buying expensive cars?
Yes, they can. Motor vehicles are part of the costs of the mine 
and are deducted from profits. If the managers buy expensive T V
luxury Mercedes and BMW cars instead of Toyotas and Nissans this 
will reduce the amount of profit available for sharing. But, 
under the profit sharing rules, we can ask for this information 
and find out exactly how much money is being spent in this way.
We can try to embarrass the management, but we cannot stop them 
directly from spending money as they want to.
What is "capital expenditure"?
Capital expenditure is a special sort of cost. It is very 
important because it is deducted from profits before they are 
shared. Capital expenditure (referred to as CAPEX) is money 
spent to guarantee the future of the mine. For example, 
development underground, when the mine makes cross-cuts and 
shafts to get access to new parts of the ore body, is classified 
as capex. The mine could work, maybe for a year, without capex. 
But then it would need to buy a new winding engine or sink a new 
shaft or else it would have to close. Capex is essential for the 
future of a mine. But it is not the same as day to day running 
costs - for drill bits and explosives, props and packs used in 
stoping.
Capex is actually an investment that the mine decides to make out 
of profits. The directors could pay all the capex to the 
shareholders, but then after a few months, the mine would not be 
able to continue. The Capex ensures that the mine will continue 
to operate and employ our members and that, hopefully, it will 
continue to make profits and pay dividends to the shareholders. 
The NUM believes that the profit share should be calculated
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before capex is deducted. Because the capex is spent to create 
future profits for shareholders - at a time when our members may 
have been retrenched. But we have lost this argument with the 
mine bosses. They say that capex may guarantee profits, but it 
also is needed to guarantee jobs - and when profits are made, in 
the future, they will be shared with workers. The NUM has agreed 
that capex can be deducted before profits are shared with 
workers. It is also deducted before tax is paid to the 
government.
The problem comes when capex is very big, for example when a mine 
is sinking a new shaft like at Vaal Reefs. This happens also 
when the gold price rises. Mines get more profit, and they 
invest more money in the mine through capex, wiping out profit 
available for sharing. So the mine is very profitable, but the 
shareholders are expecting their return in the future and they 
re-invest the profits, leaving a tiny profit share for 
distribution.
If the profits go up, management can rob us by spending more on 
capital expenditure so the profit for sharing is less. Is this 
fair?
Because of this problem, at Anglo mines the profit sharing only \ 
deducts the capex that is planned by the mine at the beginning of 
the year, averaged over each quarter. If the gold price goes up, 
and the mine spends more on capex than planned, it can only 
deduct planned capex. It has to pay the profit share bonus on 
any extra amount. But this also works against us if, when the 
gold price goes down, the mine cuts actual capital expenditure. 
Because it deducts the higher planned figure before sharing 
profits. J
For all these reasons the NUM has to keep a very close eye on 
capex. We have to demand a clear explanation of the amounts the 
mine says it is planning to spend. And we have to monitor the 
expenditure to check that the planned capex is not significantly 
less than the actual capex over the year. [This has not beerK^ 
done yet].
The mine always taxes the profit share so we get almost nothing. 
Can't the NUM negotiate that the profit share is free from tax?
The tax laws state that all workers have to pay tax if they earn 
more than a certain amount of money. The tax is levied on all 
income - basic wage, overtime pay, profit share, holiday leave 
allowance etc - above a certain level. The level depends on 
whether a worker is married or single and how many children and
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dependents he has. Each worker needs to check that management 
has the correct details for the tax deductions they make. And we 
can and should ask in the monitoring meetings for a clear 
explanation of how the tax deductions are calculated. But the 
NUM cannot arrange for profit shares to be free from tax.
The whites are getting much more money from the profit shares 
than the black workers. It was we who negotiated the profit 
sharing - but they still get the most benefits.
The NUM believes that the money from profit sharing should be 
split into equal rand payments for all workers.
The employers originally wanted the money split according to 
salary - so for every R100 a worker earned, he would get the same 
rand amount, but wealthy workers, because they earn more, would 
get much more in total. In fact, under this scheme of the
bosses, the whites would each get on average five times more than
blacks.
After a discussion with the white unions, the employers agreed 
that, if there is very little money to be shared (less than R25 
per month), then the money will be shared equally, as the NUM 
demands.
But if there is a lot of money for sharing,
R25 per month or one quarter of the total will be
shared in equal rand amounts
the money that is left will be shared according to 
salary.
This sharing scheme is more complicated, but it is much better 
for low-paid workers than a system that distributes money
according to salary only.
Black workers make up 90% of the workforce on the gold mines, but 
they get only 66% of the wage bill. Under the revised 
distribution scheme, black workers get between 75% and 90% of the 
total, rather than the 66% the employers proposed.
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This profit sharing is too complicated for workers to understand 
in only two days of a course. Why isn't the course at least five 
days ?
There is a saying amongst the Chinese that "Even the hardest and 
longest journey starts with the first step". The course is a 
first step, both for worker participants and for the Collective 
Bargaining Department.
Black workers have never, in over 100 years of work on the mines, 
been given the information or been assisted to gain the knowledge 
to understand the finances and operating constraints of mines. 
Mines are very large and complex organisations. So the
information has to be hard to understand. But understanding is 
an essential base for effective participation. If our members 
don't understand, workers can never take control of the mines. 
This is why the information and training and monitoring that goes 
alongside the profit sharing schemes is so vital. But worker 
criticism of the course is also essential for us to develop a 
course that really meets the needs it is supposed to. And we 
must put pressure on the employers as well to send comrades on 
appropriate training courses so that worker representatives can 
improve their understanding.
The Collective Bargaining Department is working to the following 
training programme for each mine involved in profit sharing or 
performance bonuses:
1. Basic course on profit sharing agreements, mine economics
and calculations [2 days for 30 people per company]. The
course is run by the Collective Bargaining department at the
request of the relevant branches/regional office.
2. Efforts at mine level to get involved in monitoring and to
compel the management to hold appropriate training courses 
for the branch committee. This could be followed by a 
follow-up course run by the head office for one or two days. 
Branches must request this.
3. National seminar on profit sharing and participation
(attended by relevant union officials and one person from 
each branch involved in profit-sharing/bonus schemes plus 
the rest of the Chamber negotiating team). This seminar has 
been planned since January 1993 with the LRS. The
documentation has been sent out, but still no date has been 
confirmed.
4. One day course for shaft stewards conducted at each branch
by full time shaft stewards, assisted by regional
educators/officials. Such a course will be planned for
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Harmony as a pilot at the end of October when 4 Harmony 
stewards will go the the LRS for two weeks to develop the 
course.
5. Five day course at the NUM College to cover mine economics, 
calculations, profit sharing/bonus agreements and 
communication methods in more depth. Planned for 1994.
None of this will happen, however, if the branches do not fight 
for it and send the appropriate people to the courses. And none 
of this will have any effect if there are not proper report 
backs.
The profit sharing schemes may be complicated. In fact they are 
complicated. But they are also an opportunity to empower our 
members with information and understanding about their companies 
and their industry. And we know, as well as the bosses, that 
"Knowledge is Power!".
1.
D:\IIC\PMC3HST - September 20 , 1392
ROM Collective Bargaining Department 6
P R O F I T  SHARlMGr C A L C U L A T I O N
H O W  T o  
C h e c k  t h e
r ( \ T
£  a ui p VMev\t oeedeieci ■' .acest puU ished Cj ucu/tei/ly results 
.CitcSt Jvime pnopt shia/e calculators
Pv'cfi't >̂laa\fttrcj A oy '
C a i c u i o d  o\s
T H T E E  S T A G E S
W e  che.ok th-e r e s u l t s  fn 3  s t a g e s  . £taj-e
lyu s  it s  OCOIA W Onk .
1  "Pr o  F it (x £/\j0R/3T7OW
—T c h e c k t h a t  t h e
hai/e TUe Sqvue h
Q u estio n  ■ Hoou iMucU. 
b e f u e ^ n
PR O FIT  d i v i s i o n
—5> e h e c  k AOUj tH e
k e j  Q uestion • V\J klccf is
# 3 P r o f it  D i s t ^ i Bo it o n
wi i n-eS pno^-Vf sUav<z calculdtwLs
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